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Abstract 
Decentralized and Centralized Supply Chain with Trade Credit Option 
Ruo Du 
Advisors: Avijit Banerjee, Ph.D.; Seung-Lae Kim, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
The notion of a trade credit period is a common business practice, where a supplier 
allows a buyer a specified period to make a payment in full for a purchase made. The 
objective of this thesis is to explore the role of such a credit payment option in supply 
chain management. Towards this end, a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a single 
supplier (e.g. manufacturer) and the cases of both a single and multiple buyers (e.g. 
retailers) is examined under decentralized (independent) and centralized (coordinated) 
decision making scenarios. The major emphasis of this research is limited to the case of a 
single product with price-sensitive deterministic, as well as stochastic market demand. 
 
    The conditions under which a trade credit period should be offered and its appropriate 
length are determined from the supplier’s perspective under the decentralized case. Under 
the centralized decision scenario, the efficacy of a trade credit policy as a supply chain 
coordination mechanism is thoroughly analyzed and guidelines for pricing, production 
and delivery decisions are developed. The concepts developed in this study are illustrated 
via a number of numerical examples, in conjunction with thorough sensitivity analyses 
involving some selected problem parameters. 
 
The major contribution of this thesis is that we incorporate the pricing and inventory 
issues in supply chains with an endogenous credit payment period. This is the first study 
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that examines the efficacy of trade credit option as a coordination mechanism. We 
propose a coordination mechanism that coordinates the supply chain, when a trade credit 
by itself is not sufficient to serve such a purpose, while preserving the benefits of a trade 
credit option. Also, this study is the first to examine the issues concerning trade credit 
under price sensitive stochastic demand. Another first for this work is the exploration of 
the implications of a trade credit policy in supply chains consisting of multiple competing 
retailers. The effects of the extent of competition and the market size on trade credit 
policy are evaluated. Our analyses lead to some important practical implications, to serve 
as managerial guidelines.  
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0.1 List of Symbols used 
 
Deterministic Model: 
Retailer: 
 :      Retail price charged by the buyer ($/unit); 
 (p): Product’s market demand rate as a function of retail price (units/year); 
   :  Constant coefficient and price elasticity in demand function; 
 :     Retailer’s (buyer’s) order lot size (units); 
  :    Buyer’s fixed ordering cost ($/order); 
  
      Opportunity cost of capital for the retailer ($/unit/year); 
  
      Buyer’s physical inventory holding cost ($/unit/year); 
       Total inventory holding cost of the buyer in $/unit/year, where      
    
 ; 
  :    Buyer’s annual gross profit ($/year). 
Suppler: 
 :     Unit wholesale price charged by the supplier to the buyer ($/unit);  
 :    Unit manufacturing cost of the product ($/unit); 
 :     Number of delivery batches per production run (batch size multiplier); 
 :     Supplier’s production rate (units/year);  
  :    Fixed setup cost of a production batch ($/setup);   
  
 :    Opportunity cost of capital for the supplier ($/unit/year); 
  
 :    Supplier’s physical inventory holding cost ($/unit/year); 
  :    Total inventory holding cost for the supplier in $/unit/year, where      
    
 ; 
  :    Supplier’s annual gross profit ($/year). 
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Supply chain: 
 :     Credit period length allowed for the buyer to make a purchase payment;   
      Total gross profit for the entire supply chain ($/year); 
      Quantity discount factor as a proportion of the regular wholesale price. 
 
Price sensitive Stochastic Model: 
Retailer: 
 :      Retail price charged by the buyer ($/unit); 
    :   Market demand rate as a function of retail price (units/year); 
   :   Constant coefficient and price elasticity in the demand function; 
 :      Retailer’s reorder point in (r, Q) policy; 
 :      Retailer’s order lot size in (r, Q) policy; 
        Retailer’s order up to level in (S, T) policy; 
        Retailer’s replenishment order cycle time in (S, T) policy; 
  :     Retailer’s fixed ordering cost ($/order); 
  
      Opportunity cost of capital for the retailer ($/unit/year); 
  
       Retailer’s physical inventory holding cost ($/unit/year); 
        Total holding cost of the buyer in $/unit/year, where      
    
 ; 
  :     Buyer’s annual gross profit ($/year). 
Supplier: 
 :    Unit wholesale price charged by the manufacturer to the retailer ($/unit);  
 :     Unit manufacturing cost of the product ($/unit); 
 :    Number of delivery batches per production run (batch size multiplier) or the lot 
size multiplier for the manufacturer; 
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 :      Supplier’s production rate (units/year);  
  :     Fixed setup cost of a production batch ($/setup);   
  
 :    Opportunity cost of capital for the supplier ($/unit/year); 
  
 :    Supplier’s physical inventory holding cost ($/unit/year); 
  :     Total inventory holding cost for the supplier in $/unit/year, where      
    
 ; 
  :   Supplier’s annual gross profit ($/year). 
Supply chain: 
 :      Credit period length allowed for the buyer to make a purchase payment;   
       Total gross profit for the entire supply chain ($/year); 
 
Multiple Retailers Model: 
Retailers: 
  :    Retail price charged by the buyer i ($/unit); 
  :    Demand for retailer i as a function of its retail price (units/year); 
        :  Coefficients in the demand function for retailer i; 
  :    Retailer i’s order lot size (units); 
  :    Retailer i’s fixed ordering cost ($/order); 
  
       Opportunity cost of capital for retailer i ($/unit/year); 
  
       Retailer i’s physical inventory holding cost ($/unit/year); 
        Total inventory holding cost of retailer i in $/unit/year, where      
    
 ; 
  :     Retailer i’s annual gross profit ($/year). 
Suppler: 
 :      Unit wholesale price charged by the supplier to the buyers ($/unit);  
 :     Unit manufacturing cost of the product ($/unit); 
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 :      Production cycle length; 
 :      Supplier’s production rate (units/year);  
  :     Fixed setup cost of a production batch ($/setup);   
  
 :    Opportunity cost of capital for the supplier ($/unit/year); 
  
 :     Supplier’s physical inventory holding cost ($/unit/year); 
  :     Total inventory holding cost for the supplier ($/unit/year), where      
    
 ; 
  :     Supplier’s annual gross profit ($/year). 
Supply chain: 
 :      Credit period length allowed for the buyers to make a purchase payment;   
       Total gross profit for the entire supply chain ($/year); 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
During the past two decades, supply chain coordination has received a great deal of 
research attention, focusing on globally optimal supply chain decisions that can benefit 
all the parties (i.e. the members of a supply chain) involved, as opposed to each party 
making its own decisions individually. A number of mechanisms, such as price discounts, 
credit payment options and buy-back contracts, etc., have been used for coordination 
purposes.  
 
 One important means for achieving supply chain coordination is the payment credit 
period option, where the supplier specifies to the buyer a finite time interval (credit 
period) within which the payment for a purchase is to be made, in lieu of immediate 
payment. Trade credit option has become a common practice in business. All the 
members of a supply chain can benefit from a well designed and implemented trade 
credit policy. Furthermore, the total supply chain can also benefit from the savings of not 
having to borrow capital from banks or other financial institutions (which usually charge 
interest or a share of the equity or profit of the borrower). A trade credit option also 
allows the downstream supply chain entities the flexibility of increasing inventory levels, 
thus, increasing product availability and attracting more customers. The supplier’s 
incentive for offering such an option is to stimulate demand by allowing credit to a 
downstream buyer which may not have sufficient capital to make a sizeable immediate 
payment, but may be induced to buy larger quantities, if some flexibility in terms of 
delaying purchase payments is available. Thus, from the supplier’s perspective, the 
resulting potential increase in sales may compensate for the loss from issuing credit 
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(Mehta (1968)). The objective of this thesis is to explore the role of such a credit payment 
option in supply chain management. 
 
Previous research has shown that, under a trade credit regime, the total supply chain 
profit can be improved if the cost of capital for the buyer is greater than that for the 
supplier (Sarmah et al. (2007)). Other benefits of the credit option are mentioned in Shinn 
and Hwang (2003) and Sarmah et al. (2007). For instance, a credit policy can serve as a 
useful tool for enhancing the supplier’s competitive position and can facilitate the 
development of a stable, long term buyer-supplier relationship, which can yield benefits 
for both the parties.  
 
Most of the related models in the existing literature assume deterministic operating 
conditions and explore the relevant policy implications either within the framework of a 
decentralized game, or assume a predetermined fixed term credit contract in a centralized 
game environment. Thus, several interesting questions arise. First, whether it is always 
beneficial for the supplier to offer a credit option, and, secondly, under what conditions 
should such an option be offered and the appropriate length of the credit period? Another 
pertinent issue is whether trade credit can be used to coordinate the supply chain and 
what is the range of the credit payment period, so that both parties are willing to 
coordinate their decisions? Consequently, we wish to analyze the effectiveness of using 
trade credit as a coordination mechanism and determine how the relevant parameters 
affect the efficacy of such a policy. Guidelines for pricing, production and delivery 
decisions are developed.  Additionally, if market demand is stochastic, how will it affect 
the decision model and the trade credit policy? Finally, what is the role of market 
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competition in a trade credit policy under a multiple retailers scenario? These issues have 
not received adequate attention in the existing body of work pertaining to this area of 
research. In summary, a significant motivating factor for undertaking this study is that, 
apart from addressing some important issues concerning a common business practice, it 
represents an important attempt to bridge some of the gaps in the existing literature, 
mentioned above,  
 
In order to address these questions in a systematic manner, this study consists of three 
distinct parts. The first part assumes price sensitive market demand for the product in 
question under a deterministic environment. The analysis contained in the second part 
relaxes the deterministic assumptions and derives appropriate supply chain policies under 
stochastic conditions. Finally, the third part of this thesis extends the findings of the 
deterministic case to a supply chain involving multiple competing buyers with a 
differentiated product. In this context, the effects of the extent of competition and market 
size on trade credit policy are examined.  
 
We first consider a deterministic model using the two coordination mechanisms, i.e. a 
credit payment option and a wholesale price discount, by analyzing five situations (with 
or without coordination and with or without the credit option and/or a discount) in 
Section 3 of this thesis. Our problem scenario, involving a single product manufactured 
by a single supplier for a single buyer, incorporates price-sensitive demand and the notion 
of the production batch size being an integer multiple of the order (or delivery) quantity, 
with a production rate that exceeds the retail demand rate. We determine the retail price, 
the buyer’s order quantity; the supplier’s manufacturing batch size and the credit period 
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allowance, when each party attempts to derive its own individual optimal policy. Then 
we develop the corresponding system optimal decisions from the perspective of the entire 
integrated supply chain. Furthermore, we explain where the additional profit originates 
from, and allude to the managerial implications for utilizing a wholesale price discount 
and/or a credit payment option as coordination mechanisms. We also derive an 
appropriate policy to fully achieve supply chain coordination, and suggest ways for the 
two parties to equitably share the additional profit, resulting from the deployment of a 
price discount and/or a credit payment period.  
 
Our analysis indicates that there are some disadvantages of using the credit option 
alone. First, we determine the maximum allowable credit time by setting the profit of the 
supplier with the credit option equal that without such an option. In this instance, there is 
no additional profit on the part of the supplier to be shared with the buyer. Secondly, the 
suitable credit time to share the excess profit can be relatively long, making it impractical 
under real world conditions. Also, in practice, it is not always easy to strictly enforce and 
follow the credit terms in buyer-supplier contracts. Finally, as our analysis indicates, 
more profit can be generated for the supply chain if we increase the credit time (even 
beyond the maximum allowable credit period), as long as the cost of capital for the 
supplier is lower than that for the buyer. Consequently, this work focuses on the 
supplier’s price discount offer in conjunction with a credit payment option, which makes 
equitable profit sharing a tractable proposition. Generally speaking, the credit period is 
often negotiable and flexible, rendering the enhancement of a coordinated supply chain’s 
profit possible. 
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Previous research involving the integration and coordination of supply chains has 
largely used either the delayed credit payment option, or a wholesale price discount, as 
separate mechanisms for achieving coordination. Our work differs from such endeavors 
in that we consider the possibility of the supplier offering to the buyer a delayed payment 
option, as well as a discount in the wholesale price of the product, simultaneously, in 
order to coordinate the supply chain and enhance its gross profit. Furthermore, in our 
models, we treat the credit period length as a decision variable, which allows the supply 
chain some flexibility, while enabling it to divide the surplus, resulting from coordination, 
in a fair and equitable manner, between the buyer and the vendor. 
 
We then study the supply chain under price sensitive stochastic demand in section 4. 
Both continuous and periodic review policies for inventory control are examined. In the 
decentralized scenario, the retailer makes the replenishment quantity and frequency 
decisions along with the pricing decision, while the manufacturer decides the length of 
the credit period and its production-distribution policy. In the centralized scenario, the 
replenishment policies, retail prices and credit period length are determined jointly to 
optimize the supply chain’s profit. In the independent optimization (i.e. decentralized) 
case, the supply chain’s problem is framed as a Stackelberg game and an equilibrium 
solution is derived. The advantages of issuing a trade credit period are examined from the 
manufacturer’s perspective. We focus on the major factors that determine the 
characteristics of the manufacturer’s trade credit policy and a detailed sensitivity analysis 
outlines the effect of changes in some selected model parameters. In the centralized case, 
the optimal supply chain decisions and the effectiveness of using credit as a coordination 
mechanism are addressed. Some interesting managerial insights are developed via 
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sensitivity analysis involving a set of numerical examples. In the scenario where the 
parameters of the decentralized supply chain results in a preferred credit option offered 
by the manufacturer, we find that the credit option is usually not an effective mechanism 
in practice to coordinate the supply chain. In contrast, under scenarios where the trade 
credit option can serve well as a coordination mechanism, the manufacturer would be 
usually unwilling to offer trade credit, without the buyer committing to an agreed upon 
ordering and pricing contract (for the independent optimization case). 
 
The analysis continues with an extension of our determinist models to the case of a 
supply chain with multiple competing retailers in section 5. We examine correlated 
retailers using a Bertrand competition for a differentiated product. We determine the 
pricing and order quantity decisions for the retailers and the manufacturer’s credit period 
offer applicable to all retailers. We are interested in how the extent of the competition and 
the changes of the whole market would affect the supply chain decisions. We develop 
two models, one with a fixed market and the other with a variable market (e.g. 
geographically dispersed retailers). How the retailers will react to the credit term offered, 
and the effects of the number of retailers and other relevant factors on the operational and 
pricing decisions of the supply chain members are explored. We provide some numerical 
examples, in order to demonstrate the effects of the nature of competition on the 
decentralized supply chain decisions and the coordination mechanisms under 
consideration. Finally, we provide some examples to further evaluate the effectiveness of 
using trade credit to coordinate the decisions of all the members of the supply chain.  
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2. Literature Survey 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Supply Chain Coordination 
 
The members of a supply chain typically consist of numerous parties, often separate 
organizational entities, e.g. suppliers, manufacturers, transporters, retailers, etc., united in 
the common goal of fulfilling eventual customer demand in the marketplace. 
Consequently, the imperative of effective management of a supply chain should be to 
improve and maximize the profitability of the entire supply chain, rather than focusing on 
the performance of any single constituent member of the chain. In order to achieve this, it 
is necessary to align the goals of the various disparate parties with those of the overall 
supply chain, through the coordination of the policies and decisions of these entities.  
 
When a supply chain lacks coordination, many problems may arise that are likely to be 
detrimental from the standpoint of overall supply chain performance. One such problem 
is the phenomenon of double marginalization, which stems from each party in a buyer- 
supplier relationship attempting to maintain its profit margin towards maximizing its own 
profitability, at the expense of the larger chain. A market price set autonomously by a 
retailer, without considering the marginal costs, inventory policies and the goals of all of 
the other involved parties, is not likely to be the optimal decision for the supply chain as a 
whole, since its goals may not be aligned with those of the overall system. In order to 
remedy the ill effects resulting from double marginalization, coordination of the decisions 
made by the individual members of the supply chain is of vital importance. The surplus, 
or additional supply chain profit, as a consequence of reducing the double 
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marginalization effect, can then be shared appropriately in an equitable manner to benefit 
all the members of the supply chain. 
 
Another undesirable phenomenon observed in real world supply chains is the well-
known “bullwhip effect”. Under market demand uncertainty, if the retail demand 
information is not effectively shared amongst the supply chain members, the perception 
of such information tends to get more and more distorted as it moves upstream along the 
various echelons of the chain. In effect, the perception of variability of demand increases 
dramatically in a cascading manner, as information moves upstream. Such increasing 
variability in perceived demand, due to a lack of coordination and adequate information 
sharing, results in non-smooth production and shipping plans, increasing related costs, 
such as production, set up, and inventory holding costs. Thus, in mitigating the disruptive 
effects of the bullwhip effect, inter-party coordination plays an important role towards 
improving the performance of the entire supply chain. In short, coordination can play a 
critical and useful role in fostering smooth physical, information and cash flows 
throughout a supply chain, facilitating the derivation and implementation of globally 
optimal operational solutions.  
 
Thus, supply chain coordination is desirable for improving the entire chain’s efficiency 
and profitability. The extant literature suggests two approaches for achieving supply 
chain coordination. In the first of these, the optimal system policies (variables) are 
determined and the resulting total profit is shared via a particular contract structure (e.g. 
price discount, buy back, etc.). The impact of the problem parameters on the supply chain 
can be examined. In the second type of coordination, the parameters of a contract 
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structure are determined, so that system optimality can be achieved in the decentralized 
case, where each party in the supply chain optimizes independently. In our research, we 
focus on the first type of contract, since system optimality is difficult to attain in a 
decentralized game under this scenario. In summary, this study attempts to bridge the gap 
in the existing literature, as mentioned earlier. 
 
The notion of joint operation and coordination was first developed by Goyal (1976). 
Subsequently, Banerjee (1986) extends this work by suggesting a joint economic lot size 
(JELS) model for the system, while compensating the buyer through a quantity discount 
offer. Lee and Rosenblatt (1986) study the lot sizing issue and a quantity discount policy 
for increasing the supplier’s profit. Chen and Chen (2005) later consider a situation where 
a manufacturer produces several products within the same facility and propose a joint 
replenishment policy using Pareto improvements, such that no party is worse off, while 
increasing the total supply chain profit. Along similar lines, Munson and Rosenblatt 
(2001) examine supply chain coordination via the quantity discount approach in three-
echelon systems. 
2.1.1     Supply chain coordination mechanisms 
 
This section reviews different types of coordination mechanisms suggested in the 
literature. The coordination techniques in supply chain management largely focus on 
improving the supply chain’s performance from an operational perspective, such as more 
accurate prediction of demand, smooth operations, shared risk, higher service level, 
economies of order size and inventory levels, etc., in order to enhance total supply chain 
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profitability. Some of the most widely studied coordination procedures are outlined 
below. 
 
Wholesale Quantity Discount. A wholesale quantity discount offer is perhaps the 
most commonly used coordination mechanism. It is easy to implement and allows the 
parties involved to share the resultant surplus profit effectively and fairly with 
considerable flexibility.  There are two basic types of quantity discount offers, viz. the all 
units price discount (where a price reduction applies to all of the units purchased, if the 
purchase order quantity exceeds a specified threshold) and the incremental price discount 
(where a reduced price is charged for only the amount above a threshold). Other forms of 
quantity discount policies also exist, such as cumulative discounts, where a price discount 
is conditional on the cumulative demand for a product over time.  
 
Quantity Flexibility. Tsay, Nahmias and Agrawal (1999) defines quantity flexibility 
as a contractual clause under which the quantity a buyer ultimately orders may deviate 
from a previously planned estimate. The conditions under a quantity flexibility buyer-
supplier contract can include an allowable range on the order quantity, pricing rules, or 
both. This type of a contract tends to benefit the retailer, while shifting the bulk of the 
risks of overstocking and understocking to the upstream supplier. This mechanism is 
often used for products with seasonal demand (usually involving greater uncertainty) and 
in those cases where demand forecasts can be updated and improved over time.  
 
Buyback Contracts. Under the terms of a buyback contract (applicable largely for 
seasonal or style goods), the supplier agrees to repurchase, albeit at a reduced price, any 
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unsold quantity, at the end of the selling period from the retailer. Thus, both parties share 
the overall risk of overstocking . The proportion of the total risk distributed to each party 
depends on the structural details of such a contract. The buyback price is usually 
determined via a negotiation process and, ultimately, depends upon the relative 
bargaining powers of the parties concerned. Interestingly, in an earlier study Pasternack 
(1985) finds that the channel coordinating prices are independent of the product’s market 
demand distribution (also see Tsay, Nahmias and Agrawal (1999)).  
 
Trade Credit or Delayed Payment Option. The notion of a trade credit option, 
offered to a buyer by a supplier, allows the former to pay the latter for purchased goods 
or services within some specified period, instead of immediate payment. Clearly, such a 
contractual feature benefits the buyer in terms a more favorable cash flow position and 
savings in its cost of capital.  Also, the possibility of delayed payment serves as an 
incentive for the buyer to purchase larger quantities, such that, if the product’s market 
demand is price-sensitive, the retail can be lowered for stimulating consumer demand. In 
other words, the supply chain as a whole can derive significant benefits from a trade 
credit policy. In contrast, the supplier is burdened with the cost of capital tied up at the 
buyer’s end and may face an unfavorable cash flow position. Nevertheless, under certain 
conditions, significant advantages can also accrue to it as a result of increased consumer 
demand and may outweigh the above mentioned drawback. Thus, it is important for the 
supplier to design a trade credit offer judiciously such that its overall profitability, as a 
consequence of implementing this type of a coordination mechanism, is enhanced. More 
details of trade credit policy implications are discussed in Section 2.2. 
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Other supply chain coordination mechanisms, such as warranty contracts, product 
return policies, transportation related discounts, revenue sharing contracts, etc. have also 
been suggested in the current literature.  
2.1.2     Supply chains with stochastic Demand 
 
Supply chains typically operate under stochastic conditions, which are characterized 
by uncertainty in demand, supply and a variety of other factors that have an impact on 
their performance. The challenges in coping with such uncertainties, particularly in the 
context of today’s global economy, become even more important, in view of the intensely 
competitive nature of most business environments. In addition to stochastic demand, 
there are often substantial uncertainties associated with delivery lead times.  
Decisions concerning inventory replenishment, production scheduling, transportation 
planning, etc. are closely inter-related, where safety stocks play a critical and useful role 
towards mitigating the unpredictable effects of environmental uncertainties and allowing 
decision makers some flexibility in formulating operational plans for complex supply 
chains. It is widely known that while safety stocks contribute towards attaining higher 
customer service levels, via enhanced product availability, such stocks also increase the 
average inventory levels throughout the supply chain and result in higher inventory 
carrying costs. In order to determine the level of safety stocks that is appropriate for a 
specific set of operating conditions, the design of an inventory replenishment policy is of 
utmost importance.   
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There are several possible types of inventory replenish policies that have been 
examined extensively in the literature and have found widespread implementation in 
practice. For a single stock location dealing with a continuously stocked inventory item 
with independent market demand, two major classes of replenishment policies have 
received much of the research attention to date. These are briefly outlined below. 
 
Continuous review policy: 
 
(r, Q) policy: This policy is also called a reorder point policy. The inventory position 
of an item is reviewed and monitored continuously. In the normal course of depletion 
through demand or usage, as soon as the inventory position decreases to r units, a new 
replenishment order of a predetermined quantity Q is placed immediately to elevate the 
inventory position, such that it is always above r. This replenish policy is usually used 
when continuous monitoring of inventory is relatively inexpensive and when a fixed 
replenishment quantity is desired due to reasons such as packing, shipping methods (full 
truck load), etc. 
 
(r, nQ) policy: This policy is similar to the (r, Q) policy. The only difference is that in 
each order, an integer multiple of a base quantity Q can be placed. This policy provides 
more flexibility compared to the (r, Q) policy and is more suitable for scenarios with 
considerably high levels of uncertainty, such as non-stationary demand. 
 
(s, S) policy: Under this replenishment policy, the inventory position is also monitored 
on a continuous basis. When the inventory position drops below s units, a new order of 
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quantity S-s is placed, in order to bring the inventory position back up to S units. This is 
modification of the (r, Q) policy for handling non-unit demand or usage transactions. 
Note that the (r, Q) and the (s, S) replenishment policies are equivalent under unit 
demand transactions, where Q is equivalent to S-s.  
 
Periodic review policy: 
 
(S, T) policy: Under this replenishment policy, the inventory position is reviewed 
periodically (instead of continuously) at fixed intervals of T time units. There are a 
number of different possible policies under the periodic review category. One such policy 
dictates that, regardless of the inventory position, a new replenishment order is always 
placed at the time of each review to elevate the inventory position to S units. Another 
policy, known as the (s, S, T) policy, specifies that a new order is placed only when the 
inventory position is below s when a review occurs, such that the replenishment order 
brings back  the inventory position up to the target level S. 
 
One approach in determining the appropriate parameters of as chosen inventory 
replenishment policy utilizes the notion of customer service level. Axsäter (2000), 
outlines three types of service level as follows: 
 
S1 = probability of no stockout per order cycle, 
S2 = “fill rate” – fraction of demand that can be satisfied immediately and routinely 
from available stock, 
S3 = “ready rate” – fraction of time with positive stock availability. 
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S1 represents the probability of satisfying demand over an order cycle without 
experiencing a stockout. S2 and S3, on the other hand, focus on the probability of routine 
demand fulfillment from the customer’s perspective. It is to be noted that S2 and S3 are 
equivalent under continuous demand.  
 
It is important to maintain a certain level of service, however measured, in order to 
meet customer expectations and reduce the costs of insufficient inventory, i.e. shortage. 
Nevertheless, a higher service level requires higher safety stocks, i.e. higher inventory 
holding costs. Thus, a balance between the costs of carrying safety stocks and the benefits 
of providing customer service needs to be attained for the formulation of a sound 
replenishment policy. 
 
    Supply chain models under stochastic demand have been extensively studied in the 
existing literature. Nagarajan and Rajagopalan (2008) provide a model to improve supply 
chain performance using holding cost subsidies for both continuous review and periodic 
review policies. Since it is difficult to derive closed-form solutions for all the decision 
variables under a periodic review policy, Eynan and Kropp (2007) adopt a Taylor’s series 
expansion approach to approximate the cost function, resulting in an EOQ like simple 
solution. Cachon (1999) propose a model for a single supplier and multiple retailers 
supply chain using scheduled ordering policies, while leaving the ordering sequence 
stochastic. Viswanathan (1997), on the other hand, suggest a heuristic policy for the 
periodic review system with multiple items.  
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Maddah, Jaber and Abbound (2004) outline a procedure for the determination of stock 
replenishment policies, assuming a given credit period, as well as a fixed replenishment 
period. Robb and Silver (2006) compare four heuristics for the buyer’s problem assuming 
gamma distributed demand. More recently, Gupta and Wang (2009) consider a discrete 
time model for a retailer, using a Markov decision process approach, to make decisions 
under both the total lost sales and full backordering scenarios. They claim that the 
structure of the optimal policy is not affected by the credit term. Tsao (2010) examine the 
notion of promotional effort on the part of the retailer for the case of multiple items. 
Chaharsooghi and Heydari (2010) propose a coordination model to jointly determine the 
retailer’s reorder point and order quantity using an (r, Q) replenishment policy and 
sharing the additional profit via credit option offer made to the buyer. Finally, Lee and 
Rhee (2011) examine the newsvendor model for perishable goods with trade credit and 
other financing options. 
 
2.1.3     Supply chains with price Sensitive Stochastic Demand 
 
    Price dependent stochastic demand models are mostly to be found in the literature that 
deal with the issues of buyback and customer rebate. Chen and Bell (2011) develop a 
model for price dependent stochastic demand with different buyback prices for customer 
returns and unsold items. Lau, Lau and Wang (2007) study the properties and related 
schemes for a newsvendor product supply chain. Yao, Leung and Lai (2008a) 
numerically examine the impact and characteristics of a return policy under price 
dependent stochastic demand. Arcelus, Kumar and Srinivasan (2006) study the pricing 
and rebate policies in a supply chain with asymmetric information and outline the 
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conditions under which the retailer can benefit from sharing market demand information 
with the supplier. Zhou (2007) incorporates a price dependent stochastic demand to 
compare the efficiencies of four different price discount policies. Ray, Song and Verma 
(2010) compare two different backordering cases –time independent backordering and 
time dependent backordering, and find out that the former case results in longer review 
periods but lower retail prices. Ray, Li and Song (2005) analyze the characteristics of a 
supply chain with tailored decision making and show how the decisions are affected by 
the prevailing management paradigm. 
2.1.4     Supply Chains with Multiple Retailers 
 
Feng and Viswanathan (2007) examine a multiple buyer supply chain model using 
common replenishment epochs for coordinating supply chain inventories. They find that 
the benefits of coordination through a common replenishment period decreases as the 
coefficient of variation of market demand distribution increases and that such 
coordination may not always be desirable under very high levels of demand uncertainty. 
Cachon and Fisher (2000) explore the advantages of shared information in a two-echelon 
supply chain with a periodic review policy under stationary stochastic demand. 
Subsequently, Cachon (2001) formulate another model with inventory competition and 
propose a supply chain contract that derives the optimal policy as a Nash equilibrium. It 
is shown that, the smoothing of the flow of goods tends to work better than expediting 
information flow. Berling and Marklund (2006) introduce a new coordination mechanism 
with induced near optimal backorder cost and analyze its practical implications. Hsieh, 
Liu and Wang (2010) suggest a coordination model with price sensitive demand and 
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short-term discounting. They point out that the distributer’s profit will increase as price 
elasticity increases and decreases as the number of retailers increase. Similarly, Boyaci 
and Gallego (2002) examine the pricing and inventory polices for a multiple retailers 
supply chain assuming geographically dispersed retailers with uncorrelated demand.  
 
Cases of multiple retailer models with price competition can also be found in the 
literature. Bernstein and Federgruen (2003) analyze a distribution system both under 
price competition and quantity competition. They are the first to outline the specific 
conditions under which a Nash equilibrium solution exists. Bernstein and Federgruen 
(2005) also study decentralized supply chains under demand uncertainty, and 
consequently suggest different types of coordination mechanisms that can enhance total 
supply chain profitability (Bernstein and Federgruen (2007)). Guan and Zhao (2010) 
consider a model with Poisson demand under an (r, Q) policy with a finite horizon. Yao, 
Leung and Lai (2008b) determine the structure of a manufacturer’s revenue sharing 
contract under a Stackelberg game with two competing retailers and examine the policy 
implications of different competitive factors. 
 
2.2       Trade Credit Option 
 
The notion of a trade credit period is a widely used business practice, where a supplier 
of materials allows a specified period for a buyer to make a payment in full for a quantity 
of delivered material. This business practice is getting more and more popular. 
Kokemuller and Media (n.d.) lists some advantages and disadvantages of trade credit: 
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    More Sales: From the perspective of the creditor, or supplier, trade credit should 
induce more sales over time by allowing customers to make purchases without immediate 
cash. This flexibility in purchasing methods also encourages customers to make larger 
purchases when prices are right than they might if they had to pay cash upfront. Along 
with higher sales volume, trade credit often produces interest fees and late payment fees 
for creditors, which increases revenue. 
 
    No Cash: From the resellers perspective, the ability to buy on credit makes it possible 
to buy needed inventory even when cash balances are low. Having cash to pay off long-
term debt and other more urgent and immediate expenses is critical. The ability to delay 
cash requirements for supplies and inventory helps preserve cash for these purposes. 
Buyers may want to ramp up the volume of purchases at a time when demand is higher, 
and a trade account makes it more feasible to do so. 
 
    Immediate Replenishment: Just as consumers rely on credit cards when immediate 
needs come up and cash is not available, businesses have needs that include inventory 
and supply replenishment. If a manufacturing has a rush order of a large volume of 
products and low cash on hand, it needs a trade account to purchase raw materials for use 
in production. In essence, the trade account helps prevent delays in business activity and 
work performance. 
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    Bad Debt: The potential risk to the supplier when offering trade credit is bad debt. If 
buyers do not pay off their debt, and in a timely manner, it has negative cash effects on 
the supplier. Companies eventually have to write off unpaid accounts as bad debt, which 
lowers their profits. Accounts that remain unpaid for a long period of time still have 
negative effects, though. This means the supplier has to wait to collect cash which it 
needs to pay its own bills. 
 
    High Costs: If buyers are not careful in the way they use trade credit, they can end up 
paying much higher costs for inventory. Many companies offer a 2-percent discount if 
you pay within 10 days, but payments received after 30 days usually include late-
payment fees and interest that begins accruing. In its overview of trade credit, 
"Entrepreneur" notes that purchases on account can cost between 12 to 24 percent extra 
in interest fees if the business does not pay within the typical 30-day net payment term. 
 
Goyal (1985) first introduced this mechanism in an EOQ model with a determined 
credit time from the standpoint of the buyer; a concept that has been extended and 
improved by Chung (1998). Kim et al. (1995) develop a model for determining the 
optimal credit period length from the perspective of the supplier. Also, Khouja and 
Mehrez (1994) compare policies with and without the credit time linked to the order 
quantity and show that suitable policies can lead to substantially different buyer order 
quantities.  
 
Abad and Jaggi (2003) first consider the problem of delay in payments under non-
cooperative and cooperative relationships with price sensitive demand. They develop 
25 
 
their analysis by utilizing the concepts of both a Pareto efficiency solution, as well as a 
Nash bargaining cooperation game. Later, Jaber and Osman (2006) develop an integrated 
model, considering opportunity gain and loss that have a compounding rate of return. 
Subsequently, Yang and Wee (2006) extend their work for deteriorating items with finite 
replenishment rates. 
 
More recently, Ouyang, Ho and Su (2008) have proposed an inventory model, where 
both trade credit terms and freight rate are determined by the order quantity. Chang et al. 
(2009) present a similar model where a trade credit is offered with a threshold time, 
without considering freight costs. Both of these papers specify fixed credit periods and 
consider only the coordinated situation without comparison with the un-coordinated 
scenario, leaving no room for profit sharing. Therefore, the profit for each party, which is 
determined by the relevant model parameters, is fixed. In contrast, Chen and Kang (2007) 
consider both the scenarios, i.e. with and without coordination, with a fixed threshold 
credit time, under the assumption of deterministic demand. Sarmah et al. (2007) also 
explore both situations and suggest a procedure that divides the supply chain surplus 
equitably, after both parties achieve their own profit targets. Finally, Sheen and Tsao 
(2007) develop a model with price sensitive demand and quantity discounts for freight 
cost with a fixed cost for quantities within a specified range. Their model assumes that 
the opportunity costs of capital are the same for both parties in determining the order 
quantity, price and credit time allowance to achieve maximum channel profit. This leads 
to the specification of the credit period range that should be offered.  
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Another related study considers a multiple retailers model with a credit payment 
option (Sarmah, Acharya and Goyal, 2008). This paper develops a procedure for 
determining the length of the credit period to be offered in order to induce the 
uncorrelated retailers to coordinate their decisions, under the assumption of a 
deterministic operating environment. 
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3. Deterministic Model 
 
 
 
 
3.1        Model Preliminaries 
 
Assumptions: 
1. The operating environment is deterministic. 
2. The supply chain structure considered in this study involves a single supplier 
(manufacturer) and a single buyer dealing with a single product. 
3. For a coordinated supply chain, both parties share complete information and 
strictly follow the terms of the purchase/delivery contract.  
4. The supplier’s production rate is greater than the buyer’s market demand rate   
5. Shortages are not allowed. 
6. The item’s unit physical inventory holding costs per year are the same for both 
parties. 
7. The item’s demand is price sensitive; i.e. the demand, D, as a function of the unit 
price, p, is given by:          where   is the demand elasticity coefficient 
(   ) and   is a constant parameter. 
8. The manufacturer’s production batch size (nQ) is an integer multiple of the 
buyer’s order quantity (Q), where n is a positive integer. 
9. The product’s regular (undiscounted) wholesale price is greater than its 
production cost and is exogenously determined, based on current industry 
practice. 
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3.2        Independent optimization without credit option 
 
    In this section, we consider the situation without coordination, where neither a credit 
option nor a wholesale discount is offered. Initially, the buyer maximizes its gross profit 
by determining simultaneously its order size, , and the retail price,  . Subsequently, 
based on the buyer’s ordering policy, the vendor determines its manufacturing batch size 
via the batch size multiplier,  , in order to maximizes its own individual gross profit. 
 
3.2.1     Buyer’s problem 
 
For a pair of (   ) values, the buyer’s annual gross profit function consists of the sales 
revenue, purchasing cost, ordering cost and inventory holding cost (consisting of the 
physical holding cost and the cost of capital). Since there is no coordination in this 
scenario, total inventory carrying cost per year is computed on the basis of the average 
inventory level,    , and     is the number of orders per year. Thus, the annual gross 
profit can be expressed as 
 
                  
    
 
   
 
 
                                                                                
 
    The optimal price as a function of the order quantity, i.e. p*(Q), can be easily obtained 
by equating the first derivative of (3.1) with respect to  to 0 at p=p*(Q) 
as follows:  
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Furthermore, the following inequality must hold for satisfying the second order 
optimality condition, i.e. p*(Q) in (3.2) maximizes the buyer’s gross profit expressed by 
(3.1): 
 
  
   
   
   
  
 
                                                                                                                              
 
Substituting (3.2) into (3.1), the buyer’s gross profit can now be expressed as a 
function of its lot size alone, i.e. 
 
       
 
 
 
 
   
   
  
 
  
   
 
 
 
                                                                                      
 
We know that       is a convex-concave function in  (see Kim et al. (1995), Abad 
and Jaggi (2003) and Sheen and Tsao (2007)), where it is convex over negative values of 
      and concave over positive values of      . Restricting the buyer’s gross profit to 
only positive values, we consider the concave part of the profit function (3.1’). Once 
again the first order optimality condition leads to the following expression for the buyer’s 
optimal order lot size: 
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Also, the following inequality ensures the second order optimality condition: 
 
  
       
  
                                                                                                                                     
 
   Note that in expression (3) above, Q* appears on both sides of the equation. In this 
form, a direct solution for the optimal lot size is cumbersome to obtain. Nevertheless, the 
value of Q* can be arrived at either via any commonly available equation solving 
software, or by an iterative procedure, initializing with                from the 
second order optimality condition above. 
 
3.2.2 Supplier’s problem   
 
     Given the buyer’s lot size, the vendor’s task here is to compute the number of 
purchase (delivery) lots comprising a single production batch, i.e. its batch size multiplier, 
n, in order to maximize its own gross profit. The supplier’s gross profit function, shown 
below, consists of its wholesale revenue, production cost, ordering cost and inventory 
holding cost, including the physical holding cost and the cost of capital. The average 
inventory now is given by 
 
 
               where        (see, for example, 
Pan and Yang (2002), Chang et al. (2006) and Chen and Kang (2007)). Hence, the 
vendor’s gross profit function is 
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     We can easily show that the supplier’s gross profit function above is strictly concave 
in n. Therefore, by equating the first derivative of (4), with respect to n, to zero at n=n*, 
we obtain the following expression for the optimal batch size multiplier,  *, which 
maximizes  : 
 
    
    
           
                                                                                                                 
 
    By definition, the lot size multiplier is restricted to be an integer. It is easy to check 
that profit function (3.4) is strictly concave in n. Thus, if the n* value yielded by (3.5) is 
non-integer, we check the surrounding integers            and, accordingly, set n* to 
one of these integer values that maximizes the supplier’s profit function (3.4).  
 
3.3     Independent optimization with credit option 
 
     Under this scenario, with a permissible credit payment period of t, the buyer 
maximizes its own gross profit individually by determining its order size,   and retail 
price,  . In turn, the vendor maximizes its individual profit by choosing both the credit 
period length,  , and its production lot size multiplier,  , assuming it knows how the 
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buyer will determine its individually optimal retail price and the purchase order quantity 
based on the credit option provided. 
 
3.3.1    Buyer’s problem 
 
The buyer’s gross profit function now results from adding one additional term, 
representing the gain from delaying the payment as per the credit terms, to (1). Thus, 
given that   
  is the cost of capital per unit per time unit and D is the annual demand rate, 
we have 
 
               
 
 
   
 
 
        
                                                                          
 
     As before, the first order condition yields the optimal price as a function of the order 
quantity, i.e. 
 
      
 
   
     
  
  
 
                                                                                                     
 
Substituting (7) into (6), the buyer’s gross profit as a function of Q alone is given by 
            
       
 
 
 
 
   
      
  
  
 
  
   
 
 
 
                                                                                    
 
Hence, the first order condition obtained from the above profit function leads to the 
determination of the optimal order quantity, i.e. 
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Once again, the second order optimality condition is   
 
  
       
       
  
                                                                                                                                     
 
From (3.8), Q* can be determined either by any standard equation solving software, or 
via an appropriate iterative solution technique, as mentioned earlier.  
 
    Comparing equations (3.2) with (3.7) and (3.3) with (3.8), it is clear that the 
availability of a credit payment option increases the buyer’s order size and reduces the 
retail price, i.e.       
           
 and        
           
 . These findings appear to be 
logical and are consistent with real world observations. When the supplier offers a credit 
option, the buyer experiences less payment pressure and burden and is, thus, likely to 
adopt a larger purchase order quantity. In addition, the latter party now has an incentive 
to set a lower retail price in order to accommodate the increased transaction quantity and 
stimulate the item’s market demand, achieving a new optimal policy with higher profit. 
 
Proposition 3.1:  In an un-coordinated supply chain with a delayed payment option,   
increases (decreases) and   decreases (increases) as the credit time,  , increases 
(decreases).  
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Proof is shown in Appendix A. 
 
3.3.2     Supplier’s problem 
 
The supplier’s focus is now on choosing  and   towards its own profit maximization. 
Its gross profit in this case is obtained by subtracting from the profit function (3.4) the 
loss resulting from offering credit over an interval of  , i.e.  
 
               
   
  
 
 
 
            
 
 
         
                           
                                   
 
In reality, the supplier may be unwilling to offer a credit period of excessively long 
duration, due to a variety of practical problems. One such problem involves its own cash 
flow requirements. A steady and adequate cash flow stream is often necessary for the 
supplier’s continual and smooth operation. Thus, while improving the cash flow situation 
of the buyer, the supplier is at a disadvantage due to payment delays. In order to capture 
this notion, we add a cash flow related constraint to the supplier’s problem, where the 
credit period   should not be longer than a pre-determined threshold value of   , which is 
tolerable on the part of the supplier, in order to ensure adequate working capital levels for 
its own needs. 
 
    If the credit period length is fixed exogenously and specified in a purchase contract 
based on current industry norm, the supplier’s problem is similar to the one under the 
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scenario of non-coordination without a credit option and the optimal number of 
batches,   , can be obtained via equation (3.5).  
 
3.4        Joint optimization with and without credit option  
 
Under the assumptions that the supplier and the buyer share all relevant information 
and that both parties strictly follow the terms of a purchase contract with a delayed 
payment option, we compute the total supply chain profit by determining the retail price 
and the lot size for the buyer; the batch size multiplier for the supplier and the credit 
period length. Since the model and the solution algorithm for the scenario of coordination 
without credit will be very similar to the ones for the case with a credit option, we 
explore and outline only one of these cases here, viz. the one with the delayed payment 
option. The results for the scenario without the credit option are similar to the results 
obtained below, without the credit value factor    
    
     . 
 
    With a specified credit period of t, the gross profit functions for the vendor and the 
buyer have been developed earlier, expressed by equations (3.9) and (3.6), respectively. 
Thus, the total supply chain gross profit, , is obtained by adding these, resulting in the 
following joint optimization problem where the optimal values of p, Q, n and t need to be 
determined: 
 
Max             
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 Subject to:          
      
              
         
and   is an positive integer. 
 
    From the objective function above, it is easy to see that if the supplier’s cost of capital 
exceeds that of the buyer, no credit payment option should be offered, i.e. t=0, which 
maximizes (3.12).  
On the other hand, if the opposite is true, i.e.  
    
 , then t can be increased for 
increasing the total supply chain gross profit. Needless to say that a credit period of any 
length (t > 0) increases the buyer’s profit and, at the same time, it reduces the supplier’s 
profit. From the perspective of the whole supply chain, a positive credit period would be 
desirable if the buyer’s gain outweighs the supplier’s loss. In this circumstance, t can 
increase indefinitely for maximizing overall supply chain profit. Although this 
observation holds true mathematically, an unbounded t poses some serious practical 
difficulties, as mentioned earlier. As alluded to above, a supplier needs working capital 
for day-to-day operating expenses and would prefer prompt payments from its buyers. 
While a relatively short delay in the receipt of payments may be tolerable for enhancing 
overall system performance, an inordinately long credit period is likely to be 
unacceptable and problematic in practice for the supplier. Nevertheless, since it may be 
difficult to accurately assess an appropriate penalty for an excessively long credit period 
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from the vendor’s viewpoint, we limit the credit period length to an upper bound, t0, as 
was done earlier in (3.9). 
 
Considering the objective function (3.12) above, if we take the first and second partial 
derivatives with respect to  , for fixed values of p and Q, we obtain the following first 
and second order optimality conditions: 
 
  
  
 
   
 
    
 
 
         and  
   
   
  
    
 
       
 
    As pointed out earlier,   is a concave function in   for fixed values of p and Q. Thus, 
the problem above is reduced to finding a local optimal solution. A procedure towards 
this end is outlined below. 
 
3.4.1     Solution algorithm: 
 
We suggest the following solution methodology:  
Step 1.  Initialize with      
Step 2.  To find the maximum supply chain profit,                 ,set the first 
derivative of (12) with respect to  to zero and obtain the corresponding optimal price as a 
function of , i.e. 
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    Inserting equation (3.13) into (3.12), we have the total supply chain profit as a function 
of solely : 
     
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
 
  
 
        
    
     
   
  
       
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                                                           
    Solving the first order optimality condition of equation (3.14) we obtain the expression 
involving   as shown below:  
  
 
   
 
  
   
 
 
 
  
 
        
    
     
   
  
      
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
    
 
  
  
      
 
 
 
                                                                                                 
    Notice that the above equation is not in a closed form. But it can be easily solved in 
many software, e.g. Excel, Matlab, etc. By solving the above equation we can obtain the 
buyer’s jointly optimal order quantity, Q*.  
Step 3.  Set      , and repeat step 2 to find                 . 
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Step 4.  If                                          , go to step 3, or 
else go to step 5. 
Step 5.  Set                                               and 
                 represents a local optimum. 
 
Furthermore, according to Lemma 2, outlined below, the solution yielded by our 
algorithm is, indeed, the global optimum. 
 
Lemma 3.1:                       obtained via the algorithm outlined above is the 
global optimum solution.  
 
The proof is shown in Appendix A. 
 
3.5        Coordination and profit sharing via wholesale discount 
 
    In this section, we discuss the notion of a wholesale price discount, as a means for 
encouraging the supplier to purchase larger quantities and consequently lower its retail 
price and increase market demand, resulting in higher supply chain profit. Clearly the 
overall effects of such a discount are similar to the ones resulting from a credit payment 
option. In addition, towards establishing an appropriate wholesale price reduction, we 
suggest a fair and equitable way for the two parties to share the additional total supply 
chain profit generated by the integration of the supply chain with (or without) the credit 
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option, as opposed to the independent optimization scenario with (or without) credit. Two 
cases, outlined below, warrant some discussion. 
 
Case 1:    
    
  
We know that if the cost of capital for the supplier is greater than that of the buyer, it is 
more desirable, from a profit perspective, for the supply chain to adopt a quantity 
discount mechanism than to use a credit payment option (see Sarmah (2007)). Also from 
(3.12), it is clear that the total supply chain profit is maximized with t=0, i.e. when no 
credit option is offered.  
 
     Thus, under coordination without a credit option, we use the concept of a wholesale 
price discount to divide the total supply chain profit amongst the two parties in a fair and 
equitable manner. Let the notation of double asterix (**) denote the respective profits 
with a discounted wholesale price, but without a credit option, and the single asterix (*) 
represent the uncoordinated, individually derived optimal profits with the regular price in 
effect. For sharing the additional value yielded by coordination in a fair and equitable 
manner, in proportion to each party’s original uncoordinated gross profit, we suggest a 
profit sharing rule that satisfies 
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    Under this regime, the individually optimal profits,   
            and the jointly 
optimal supply chain profit,   , are obtained from (3.1), (3.4) and (3.12), respectively, 
with the regular wholesale price v and t=0. The   
  and   profit values are based on an 
unknown discounted wholesale price,v*, instead of v, the regular wholesale price with 
t=0. Thus, the discounted unit wholesale price,  , is easily determined from (3.16). 
Consequently, the discount factor is expressed by           . This proportional 
gain sharing concept appears to be fair, as well as equitable and can, at least, serve as a 
baseline position for negotiations between the buyer and the vendor. It is to be noted that 
this profit sharing scheme is only one of many possible ways to “fairly” divide the 
surplus resulting from coordination. The actual profit share accruing to each party in a 
real world scenario will, of course, depend upon the relative bargaining power enjoyed by 
each member of the supply chain within a negotiation framework. 
 
Case 2:    
    
  
    As mentioned earlier, when a credit option is in effect with   
    
 , the longer the 
credit period, t, the higher the total supply chain profit, albeit with declining vendor profit 
(see (3.12) and (3.9), respectively).  The impracticality of an excessively long credit 
payment period has been discussed earlier. Therefore, under this condition, a wholesale 
price discount in conjunction with an agreed upon credit period (based on accepted 
industry practice or prevailing norms) appears to be a reasonable approach in order to 
induce the buyer to adopt a coordinated policy, which is optimal for the entire supply 
chain. Once again, the discount can serve as a mechanism for sharing the additional 
supply chain profit fairly. A profit sharing rule similar to the one shown above by (3.16), 
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now with a predetermined credit payment period, t, yields the discounted wholesale price 
and the resulting discount factor via algorithm 5.1 outlined above. 
3.6        Numerical example and sensitivity analysis 
     In order to illustrate the concepts developed in this paper, we utilize a modified 
version of the example provided by Chang et al. (2009), where the relevant parameter 
values are 
 
                                                      
                           ,              , 
  
    
        
         
                      ($/unit/year) 
 
We solve several problem instances under a variety of operating scenarios as described 
below:  
Case 1 - U: Uncoordinated supply chain without credit option and discount. 
Case 2 - U{t}: Uncoordinated supply chain with a given credit payment option: 
a. U{t=1month}, i.e. t = 1/12 year 
b. U{t=3 months}, i.e. t = 3/12 year 
c. U{t*} –optimal credit period by optimizing (11) subject to (7) and (10) 
Case 3 – C{d}: Coordination with a price discount, but no credit option. 
Case 4 – C{t}: Coordination with a credit option, but no price discount 
a. C{t = 3 months}, i.e.              
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b. C{t = t’}, where t’ is the credit period necessary to make the supplier’s profit 
approximately equal to its uncoordinated optimal value, as in Case 1, without 
considering the cash flow related constraint on the credit period length. 
Case 5 – C{d, t}: Coordination with both a discount and a credit option  
a.  C{d, t=1 month (1/12 year)} 
b. C{d, t=3 months (3/12 year)}. 
 
    The results of solving the above mentioned ten problem instances are summarized in 
Table 1.  
 
    This table indicates that in an uncoordinated situation the adoption of a credit payment 
policy (with a reasonable credit period, such as 1 or 3 months) tends to increase the total 
supply chain profit, albeit slightly. The profit gained in this example primarily results 
from the difference in the opportunity costs of capital,    
    
     . Also, the profit of 
the buyer declines slightly while the supplier’s profit, as well as the total supply chain 
profit increase, as the credit period is lengthened from 1 to 3 months. The optimal credit 
period, which maximizes the manufacturer’s problem, is shown to be 0.14 years, 1.68 
months. It needs to be noted that the optimal credit period for the manufacturer could also 
result to be zero (no credit is desired) or it could be bound by the cash flow constraint. 
 
     When the supply chain is coordinated via a credit option, or a wholesale price discount, 
or a combination of both, the total supply chain profit increases quite dramatically, 
compared to the uncoordinated case.  In all cases of coordination, the product’s market 
demand is increased with a reduced retail price, tending to result in increased profits for 
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both the supplier and the buyer under most circumstances, as well as for the entire supply 
chain. Table 1 also indicates that compared to the adoption of only a wholesale price 
reduction, the credit payment option as a sole coordination mechanism appears to be 
superior in terms of total supply chain profit. When the discount approach is used in 
conjunction with a reasonable credit payment option, both parties’ and the supply chain’s 
profit positions improve, although not dramatically, compared to the presence of only a 
discount in the wholesale price. 
 
    Adopting a one or three month credit payment period, without a discount, substantially 
decreases the supplier’s profit, but the buyer’s profit increases drastically, compared to 
the uncoordinated case. This is to be expected, since without the discount, the supply 
chain surplus is not shared by the two parties. With only a credit option in effect, the 
supplier’s profit tends to decrease, with higher buyer profit, if a multi-year credit 
payment period is allowable. We can see in Table 1 that a 2.25-yearcredit period is 
required for the supplier’s profit to be approximately at par with its maximum achievable 
profit without any coordination. It is to be noted that the total supply chain profit 
increases as the credit period is increased, with or without a discount. Nevertheless, as 
under the uncoordinated case, a multi-year credit period is likely to be impractical and 
maybe highly undesirable from the supplier’s standpoint. 
 
    Another observation that can be made by examining Table 1 is that supply chain 
coordination tends to increase the buyer’s order size, with a concurrent reduction in retail 
price, while the supplier’s production lot size multiplier tends to increase. Overall, the 
detailed results of our numerical example indicate that for the purpose of enhancing the 
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total supply chain profitability, a coordinated system employing a combination of a 
wholesale price discount and a credit payment option with a reasonable credit period, 
consistent with existing industry practice appears to hold substantive merit from the 
perspectives of both the buyer and the supplier. In particular, if the price discount is 
utilized for an equitable allocation of the supply chain surplus in a manner similar to our 
methodology, both parties will not be averse to coordination and are likely to share the 
relevant information in a cooperative environment. 
 
    Finally, we examine the sensitivity of the uncoordinated and coordinated supply chain 
solutions to a parameter of interest, i.e. β, the demand elasticity coefficient. Table 3.2 
shows the individual optimal profits of the supplier and the buyer, as well as the total 
supply chain profit without coordination (i.e.                        ) for varying 
values of β. This tables also contain the respective profit values, indicated 
by   
    
         that result from the implementation of a wholesale price discount 
mechanism for profit sharing based on (3.16), in conjunction with a credit payment 
period of 3 months (0.25 year). The last column in this table contains the percent increase 
in the entire supply chain’s profit, resulting from coordination. 
 
    Table 3.2, where β varies from 1.76 to 1.80, indicates that as this parameter value 
increases, the benefits of supply chain coordination tend to become more pronounced, 
with an increasing wholesale price discount, while the producer’s lot size multiplier tends 
to decline, with or without coordination. It is clear that as the effect of the retail price in 
influencing demand strengthens, the argument in favor of implementing supply chain 
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coordination incorporating a wholesale discount and a credit option appears to gain 
strength. 
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4. Price Dependent Stochastic Demand Model 
 
 
 
 
4.1        Model Preliminaries 
 
In this model, we explore the problem scenario under price dependent stochastic 
demand. Uncertainty in demand gives rise to additional challenges in modeling the 
supply chain. More specifically, a supply chain under such operating conditions would 
carry safety stocks in order to reduce the risk of stockouts. Consequently, prices may 
need to be adjusted to accommodate higher inventory levels and the buyer and the 
supplier both need to balance the costs of holding additional inventories and those related 
to stockouts. In this context, the extent of demand uncertainty is likely to play an 
important role in the decision making process. In this chapter, we first analyze the effects 
of demand uncertainty on the credit option in the supplier’s problem and how the credit 
option affects the buyer’s inventory replenishment and pricing decisions in the 
decentralized case. We also examine the role of the credit option as a coordination 
mechanism, the ranges of trade credit period length necessary for coordination and the 
effectiveness of such a policy in the centralized case 
 
In the literature, there are two basic forms of stochastic demand: the additive form and 
the multiplicative form. In this study, it would be reasonable to assume that the variation 
in demand is proportional to its magnitude or expected value. Hence, we postulate that  
the uncertain demand rate,    has a multiplicative form, such that        , which has a 
constant coefficient of variation.      is the price sensitive part of demand, which is an 
exponential function of the retail price, i.e.,           , and   is a normally 
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distributed random variable, i.e.          . Hence, the distribution of demand is also 
normally distributed with mean         and standard deviation of          . In 
other words,                    . In the multiplicative case, the coefficient of 
variation is assumed to remain constant for different prices, i.e.,    
  
  
  . Thus, 
under the (r, Q) policy, the demand during lead time, will have a distribution of 
                     
 
  with a coefficient of variation,         
 
  
.  Under the 
periodic review (S, T) policy, the demand during the interval of cycle time plus the lead 
time (i.e. T+L) will also have a normal distribution, i.e.                
              
 
  , with          
 
    
 . Denote      and      to be the density 
and cumulative distribution functions, respectively, of the standard normal distribution. 
Also, let        and       denote the density and cumulative density functions of demand 
during lead time in the (r, Q) policy, and          and         denote the density and 
cumulative distributions functions respectively of demand T+L in the (S,T) model. 
 
In the coordinated model, we also assume that the centralized decision maker has 
complete information about market demand elasticity and the relevant parameters of both 
parties in the supply chain. Since the manufacturer produces multiple delivery batches in 
each production cycle, the risk of having unsatisfied demand is much smaller than that of 
the buyer, especially when there are multiple buyers. For the sake of simplicity, we 
assume the retailer bears all the stockout related penalties.  
 
4.2       Decentralized supply chain under (r, Q) replenishment policy  
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In this section, we study the underlying Stackelberg game for the supply chain. The 
retailer orders the products from the manufacturer using an (r, Q) policy and sells them at 
the retail level, where the demand is dependent upon the retail price as described earlier. 
Thus, the retailer chooses its reorder point r, order quantity Q and retail price p to 
maximize it profit. In turn, the manufacturer, upon receiving the order information from 
the retailer, determines the production batch size multiplier and the credit payment  terms 
to be offered to the retailer, in order to maximize its own profit.  
 
4.2.1     The retailer’s model 
 
    In the non-cooperative scenario, the retailer maximizes its profit by deciding the 
replenishment policy, the reorder point of the inventory and the order quantity, and the 
retail price. The retailer’s problem is to maximize the value of its expected profit, i.e.: 
 
  Max:                          
    
 
    
 
 
        
    
 
      
                                                          
                                                                         (4.1) 
s.t.              , 
                            
 
 
. 
 
The first term in the objective function above is the gross profit and the second 
represents the ordering cost. The third term in (4.1) is the expected inventory holding cost. 
Note that the inventory position is uniformly distributed in (r, r+Q), but the inventory 
level is not uniformly distributed. Thus the  
 
 
       is only a good approximation of 
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the average inventory level (See Hadley and Whitin (1963) and Nagarajan and 
Rajagopalan (2008)). It can also be shown that         . The fourth term in (1) is 
the penalty for backorders, where the                     
 
 
 is the expected 
backorder quantity when demand during lead time exceeds  . The normal loss function 
       can also be expressed as 
 
              
    
  
        
    
  
     
   
    Lemma 4.1: The first order conditions of the problem can be written as: 
       
    
 
                                                                                                            (4.2) 
        
    
  
 
  
 
  
    
  
                                                                                      (4.3) 
                    
  
  
 
     
 
 
                                                       (4.4) 
      The sufficient condition for a local maximum is shown in Appendix A. 
 
Proposition 4.1: 
1) The optimal profit of the retailer increases in t. 
2) The profit function of the retailer is submodular in (r, Q), (r, p) and (p, Q). 
3) The optimal retail price of the retailer    decreases in t.  
      The proof is shown in Appendix A. 
 
    The first part of the above proposition states that a longer trade credit period always 
benefits the retailer, under rational decision making. The submodularity characteristic 
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implies that for each of the pairs specified, given one of these decision variables, the 
other will decrease (or increase) as the former increases (or decreases). The final part of 
this proposition states that when a longer credit period is offered by the supplier, the 
retailer reacts with a lower market price, resulting in higher consumer demand, and hence, 
contributing towards  generating greater revenue for the supply chain. 
4.2.2     The manufacturer’s model 
The manufacturer’s problem is to determine the number of delivery batches,  , for 
each production batch   , and the credit time offered to the retailer so as to maximize its 
profit, assuming that the retailer will react to the credit period offer as described in 
section 3.1.  The manufacturer’s problem has the following form: 
 
    Max           
s.t.                                  
 
Rewriting the constraints using the optimality conditions of the retailer’s problem, the 
manufacturer’s problem can be expressed as a mixed integer non-linear problem as 
follows: 
 
 
  Max                   
 
  
               
 
 
 
 
 
     
           (4.5) 
  s.t.    
    
 
                                                                                                        (4.2) 
          
    
 
 
  
 
  
    
  
                                                                                   (4.3) 
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                                                     (4.4) 
                     
                
 
The first term in (4.5) is the gross profit. The second term is the set up cost, and the 
third term represents the expected cost of holding inventory. Finally the last term in (4.5) 
represents the loss in terms of the cost of capital due to the credit payment option. This is 
a mixed integer nonlinear programming problem, which can be solved using any mixed 
integer nonlinear programming algorithm, such as the branch and bound or the cutting 
plane procedure. For a fixed  , the problem is a nonlinear programming problem, for 
which the KKT optimality conditions can be readily derived as indicated in the following 
lemma. 
 
Lemma 4.2: The KKT conditions of the manufacturer’s problem for a given   are: 
 
      
        
                            
        
            (4.6) 
       
    
 
                                                                                                            (4.2) 
        
    
 
 
  
 
  
    
  
                                                                                      (4.3) 
                    
  
  
 
     
 
 
                                                        (4.4) 
                                  
 
    Since the parameters associated with t appears in other parts of the problem 
(objective function and/or constraints), no comparative static analysis can be derived for 
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this constrained problem directly. Therefore, we conduct sensitivity analysis in the 
numerical examples section. 
 
4.2.3     Coordinated supply chain under (r, Q) replenishment policy 
 
    In this section, we have a centralized decision maker which acts on behalf of the entire 
supply chain towards optimizing its performance.  The notion of a fair and negotiable 
credit time will be discussed so as to induce both parties to coordinate their decisions. 
The coordination can be proposed by either party. The manner in which the profit surplus 
will be shared by the buyer and the supplier will depend upon the relative bargaining 
powers of the two parties. The overall supply chain’s problem is: 
 
  Max                         
    
 
   
 
  
    
 
 
       
                                                       
 
 
 
 
 
  
    
 
                                 (4.7) 
                    
              ,  
                   
 
The first order optimality conditions pertaining to this problem for a given multiplier of 
the order batch size    are: 
 
      
    
 
                                                                                                            (4.8) 
         
  
 
 
    
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
            
 
 
   
    
  
                            (4.9)                                                 
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                                   (4.10) 
 
 
Let the superscript   to denote the decentralized optimal decisions for each party, and 
the superscript    to denote the optimal supply chain decision variables. One fair way to 
share the extra profit is to share it proportionally based on their original profit in the 
decentralized model. So the retailer’s profit under supply chain optimal variable values 
plus the saving on the proposed delayed payment should equals to the supply chain new 
profit times the original percentage of the retailer’s profit.  
 
   
                    
                      
  
           
  
           
           
 
 
We can, thus, have an upper and a lower bound for the credit payment period. The 
minimum credit period is the one that is offered such that the retailer’s savings resulting 
from the credit option should be sufficient to compensate its loss as a consequence of 
adopting the supply chain optimal decisions, instead of its own optimal policy. The 
maximum credit payment period the manufacturer can offer is the one that will make the 
manufacturer’s profit no different from its original profit in the decentralized case. 
Therefore, the entire surplus from the joint coordinated decisions of the supply chain will 
be transferred to the retailer. The mathematical expressions of these notions are       
 
          
    
              
                     
       
    
                      
        . 
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4.3        Decentralized supply chain under (S, T) replenishment policy 
 
    In this section, we study the decentralized model with the retailer adopting the (S, T) 
periodic review policy. Under this policy, inventory is reviewed at fixed intervals of T 
time units. During each review, an order is placed such that the inventory position 
reaches the order-up-to level of S. The retailer determines the values of S, T and the retail 
price simultaneously, based on the credit payment period offered. The manufacturer, as 
the Stackelberg leader, determines the credit period length and the expected number of 
deliveries per production batch, in order to maximize its own profit, again, subject to the 
first order conditions depicting the retailer’s rational behavior.  
4.3.1     The retailer’s model 
The retailer’s profit can be written as: 
 
                        
  
 
      
  
 
     
 
 
 
                       
 
 
 
  
 
To simplify this expression in the following analysis, we use the normal standard 
value    instead of    as a decision variable. The relationship between them can be 
expressed as                 . The retailer’s problem now is 
 
  Max                      
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                                 (4.11) 
 
An examination of the above objective function leads to the lemma outlined below. 
   
    Lemma 4.2: The first order optimality conditions for (4.11) can be written as the 
following set of equalities: 
 
     
 
 
                                                                                                         (4.12) 
                            
                               
                                                                                                                                      (4.13) 
                   
     
 
 
         
                     
 
 
                                                                         (4.14) 
 
The sufficient condition for a local maximum is shown in Appendix A. 
 
From (4.11) we can also obtain an expression for S in terms of  T and  p, i.e. 
 
                                       
   
 
   
 
  It is to be noted that for a given price, the value of standard normal variable z for 
determining the reorder point is independent of the retail price. In our game scenario, 
since   is a function of the price, as shown below, the value of   is related to the pricing 
decision indirectly.  
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Proposition 4.2: 
1) The optimal profit of the retailer increases in t. 
2) The profit function of the retailer is submodular in (z, T). 
3) The optimal retail price of the retailer    decreases in t.  
See a proof in Appendix A. 
 
4.3.2     The manufacturer’s model 
 
Given the retailer’s ordering policy, the manufacturer’s task is to choose the credit 
payment period and the batch size multiplier in order to maximize its own profit, based 
on the retailer’s reaction to the credit period,  , i.e. the manufacturer’s problem is 
 
Max                 
  
  
               
 
 
 
  
 
     
               (4.15) 
s.t.   
 
 
                                                                                                      (4.12) 
                              
                                  
                                                                                                                                      (4.13) 
                     
     
 
 
         
                     
 
 
                                                                         (4.14) 
                 , 
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Lemma 4.3: The KKT conditions for the manufacturer’s problem under the (S,T) 
policy for a fixed   are: 
 
      
        
                            
        
             (4.6) 
       
 
 
                                                                                                        (4.12) 
                              
                                          
                                                                                                                                       (4.13) 
                     
     
 
 
         
                     
 
 
                                                                          (4.14) 
                                  
4.3.3     Coordinated supply chain under (S, T) replenishment policy 
 
As before, we formulate the model for deriving the optimal decisions for the entire 
supply chain as follows: 
 
  Max                       
  
 
 
  
  
                   
                 
 
 
 
  
 
                            
                                         
 
 
                                                                   (4.16) 
 
The first order optimality conditions for objective function (4.16) are: 
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                                                                                                       (4.17) 
       
  
  
 
  
   
  
      
 
         
 
     
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
 
     
     
  
                                        (4.18) 
                               
 
 
         
         
 
 
                               
 
 
                     (4.19) 
 
4.4        Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis 
 
In this section, we provide several numerical examples to explore the characteristics of 
our models outlined above. 
 
Example 4.1: 
Problem parameters: 
                                         
                           
                              
Optimal solution for decentralized SC under (r, Q) policy: 
                                                             
   
            
                    
Optimal solution for centralized SC under (r ,Q) policy: 
                                                           
  
        
Optimal solution for decentralized SC under (S, T) policy: 
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Optimal solutionfor centralized SC under (S, T) policy: 
                                                          
  
      . 
 
Example 4.2: 
Problem parameters: 
                                         
                           
                           
Optimal solution for decentralized SC under (r, Q) policy: 
                                                       
   
           
                  . 
Optimal solution for centralized SC under (r, Q) policy: 
                                                           
  
        
Optimal solution for decentralized SC under (S, T) policy: 
                                                       
   
           
                    
Optimal solution for centralized SC under (S, T) policy: 
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In Fig.4.1, we depict the behaviors of the retailer’s decision variables, expected annual 
demand and profit as a result of changes in the value of  . Notice that they all change 
monotonically. The market price decreases as the credit period length increases, thus 
increasing the expected sales and the order quantity. Due to the increase in sales, the 
reorder point will also need to be increased. Overall, the retailer’s profit will increase, 
with increasing t, implying that the retailer can benefit from a longer credit period. 
 
    Figure 4.2 shows the effects of varying t on the manufacturer’s profit. In this specific 
example, the optimal    is non zero. But in other cases, the profit function may be a 
decreasing function of t over its feasible domain, where the optimal value of t would be 
zero, indicating that no credit payment option should be offered. This phenomenon and 
its implicationa are discussed below. It is also possible that the optimal credit period 
length is bound by the cash flow constraint. In such a case, the optimal credit period 
length would be the maximum allowable time dictated by the cash flow requirement. 
 
In table 4.1 and figure 4.4, we outline the influence of price elasticity on the optimal 
credit period offered by the manufacturer in the framework of a Stackelberg game. These 
show that the optimal credit period increases as the price elasticity parameter,     
increases. This is because when price elasticity is high, demand changes are more 
pronounced as the price varies. Thus, it would be desirable to use the advantage resulting 
from the increase in demand to compensate for the loss due to issuing credit to the buyer. 
On the other hand, when price elasticity is low, offering a longer credit period will not be 
attractive for the manufacturer, since the increase in its revenue would be small compared 
to the loss stemming from the trade credit. 
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The graphs shown in Figures 4.4 (b) and (c)  depict the effects of the supplier’s cost of 
capital and the coefficient of variation of consumer demand on the optimal trade credit 
period.  When the manufacturer’s cost of capital is low, the manufacturer is more 
reluctant to offer longer trade credit allowances. When market demand exhibits greater 
uncertainty, the manufacturer is more willing to offer a larger trade credit period. This is 
due to the fact that a trade credit option tends to increase retail inventory, which, in return, 
improves the customer service level and keeps the shortage at a balance level under 
higher demand uncertainty. 
 
    Finally, a detailed sensitivity analysis is conducted for all the parameters. Very 
interestingly, all the parameters have the same impact on these credit time variables. This 
means, in situations where the manufacturer voluntarily would like to offer credit to the 
retailer, it is often the case where the credit alone is not be an effective coordination 
mechanism. And in cases where the credit length is reasonable enough to coordinate the 
supply chain, the manufacturer wouldn’t prefer to offer credit in the decentralized game. 
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5. Multiple Retailers Model 
 
 
 
 
5.1        Model Preliminaries 
 
In this section, we extend the price sensitive deterministic demand model to a supply 
chain with a single manufacture and multiple retailers. In order to model market 
competition, we adopt a linear demand function, adopted by a majority of studies found 
in the economics literature (e.g. Bertrand and Cournot competition scenarios). The other 
assumptions made in Section 2 are also adopted here. Our goal is to examine the 
influence of the intensity of competition (in a fixed market) and the market size (in a 
variable market) on the trade credit option and the supply chain inventory replenishment  
and pricing policies. 
 
5.2        Supply chain with correlated retailers 
 
The relevant models pertaining to a decentralized supply chain, where each party 
attempts to derive its own optimal decisions individually, are outlined here. 
 
5.2.1    Retailer’s model 
 
First, we explore the issues starting from price competition between the retailers, via a 
Bertrand game with a differentiated product. The demand function can be expressed as: 
                                                             . 
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     The retailer’s problem now depends on the other retailers’ prices, which can be 
written as follows: 
 
  Max:                                
          
  
   
  
 
                
     (5.1) 
s.t.                               
 
The first order optimality conditions of the above problem are: 
 
                       
  
  
        
                                                         (5.2) 
   
            
  
  
  
 
                                                                                                 (5.3) 
 
A simultaneous solution of the above two conditions yields the optimum. 
 
Lemma 5.1:                is jointly concave on   and    if             
    
  
  . 
 
The proof is shown in Appendix A. This lemma assures that the solution of equations 
(5.2) and (5.3) represents a Nash equilibrium under this sufficiency condition. This 
condition is likely to be satisfied under most real world situations. Specifically, 
            is the annual demand, which is likely to be much larger that the ratio of the 
parameters, as shown. 
 
Lemma 5.2: The equilibrium found from equation (5.2) and (5.3) is the unique 
equilibrium for the retailers’ problem. 
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    The proof for Lemma 5.2 is also shown in Appendix A. Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 together 
guarantee a global optimum solution if the sufficiency condition stated in the former is 
satisfied. 
  
5.2.2 Manufacturer’s model 
 
    Given the ordering policies of the retailers, the supplier’s decision is to choose its 
review period and the allowable delay in payments that is offered to all the retailers, such 
that the latter’s profit is maximized, under the assumption that it knows how the retailers 
will react to the credit term. We further assume that there is a large number of retailers, 
such that its inventory depletion rate can be considered to be approximately uniform and 
its inventory level will be independent of the ordering sequence and the exact time 
between two consecutive orders. The manufacturer’s problem, hence, can be expressed as 
 
Max           
                        
  
 
 
 
 
       
           
 
    
                            
                                                                                           (5.7) 
  s.t.                      
  
  
        
                                                    (5.2) 
        
            
  
  
  
 
                                                                                            (5.3) 
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When the retailers are homogeneous, then at the equilibrium, the optimal prices and 
quantities are the same. In this case, the manufacturer’s problem can be written as follows: 
 
Max           
                  
  
 
 
 
 
         
     
 
            
                      (5.8) 
  s.t.              
 
 
       
                                                                      (5.9) 
        
   
  
 
  
 
                                                                                                    (5.10) 
                             
 
The supplier’s non-linear optimization problem depicted above is solvable via one of 
many available software packages. We employ NEOS Solver for this purpose. 
 
5.2.3    Supply Chain’s model 
We now examine the case where a single decision maker maximizes the total supply 
chain profit by choosing the pricing and ordering decisions for a set of heterogeneous 
retailers and the production cycle time for the manufacturer. The supply chain’s problem, 
in which the total profit is the sum of equation (5.1) and (5.7), is  
 
  Max                            
          
  
   
  
 
   
 
    
  
 
 
                                   
 
 
               
           
 
                                           (5.11) 
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By setting the first order optimality conditions for (5.11) to zeros, we obtain the 
following: 
 
                
    
  
 
 
 
       
              
 
                                 (5.12) 
  
          
  
    
  
 
                (   is independent of  )                                         (5.13) 
  
  
  
 
 
 
              
           
 
                                                                 (5.14) 
 
When the retailers are homogeneous, the problem can be simplified to: 
 
  Max                       
    
 
   
 
 
    
  
 
 
                                   
 
 
         
     
 
                                                              (5.11) 
 
As before, the first order optimality conditions are: 
 
            
   
 
 
 
 
      
       
 
                                                       (5.12) 
  
    
  
   
  
 
                                                                                                           (5.13) 
  
  
  
 
 
 
        
     
 
                                                                                  (5.14) 
Once again, the optimal solutions for both the heterogeneous and homogeneous retailers 
cases are obtained via NEOS solver. 
 
5.3        Numerical example and sensitivity analysis 
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 At this juncture, a set of numerical experiments, as outlined below, is conducted to 
explore the properties of the models developed above. A thorough sensitivity analysis is 
performed to examine the effects of the relevant parameters on the trade credit period 
length and the supply chain performance.  
 
Example 5.1: 
Parameters: 
                              
                         
                         . 
Optimal solution for decentralized SC: 
                                              
   
            
                    
Optimal solution for centralized SC: 
                                                         
  
        
 
Example 5.2: 
Parameters: 
                              
                         
                          
Optimal solution for decentralized SC: 
                                          
   
            
                     
Optimal solution for centralized SC: 
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    In Figure 5.1, we describe the effects of the characteristics of consumer demand on the 
optimal credit period length of the manufacturer. It is clear from this figure that when the 
base market demand increases (   increases, the optimal   declines, implying that the 
manufacturer is less inclined to offer a credit period option. On the other hand, as   
increases, demand becomes more sensitive to price and the manufacturer is likely to 
increase the credit period length for obtaining the benefit of increased sales resulting 
from lower prices.  
 
    In Table 5.1, we depict the effects of the number of retailers on supply chain 
performance under a fixed market scenario, where the total demand is kept fixed for a 
given price. From this summary table, it is clear that a larger number of retailers tends to 
decrease the price and increase the total market demand, shifting the equilibrium closer to 
the coordinated supply chain optimum policy. Thus, less trade credit is necessary to serve 
such a role.  
 
 Finally, we examine the sensitivity analysis in terms of the effects of all the parameters 
on the range of the credit period. Table 5.2 shows the changes on the optimal credit 
length in our Stackelberg game and the minimum credit period length (changes in the 
maximum credit period length follow the same direction as the minimum period, which is 
offered to the retailer in the centralized supply chain.  
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 In Table 5.2, we also show the changes on the trade credit period when the number of 
retailers increases in a variable market, where the individual demand function is fixed and 
the total market demand increases as the number of retailers increases. One example of 
such a case is the scenario of geographically dispersed retailers. The results indicated 
here show that both the trade credit variables would decrease with the number of the 
retailers. These changes, however, do not appear to be significant, especially in 
comparison with the changes in a fixed market, since an additional retailer in a variable 
market is unlikely to significantly change the intensity of competition. 
 
 As mentioned above, we find that the two bounds of the optimal credit period range 
change in the same direction. This implies that, when the upper limit of the range 
increases, the manufacture is willing to offer under the decentralized case, a longer credit 
period and can offer to coordinate the retailers. Similar analysis as the one shown in 
Figure 5.2 can also be done with respect to the the remaining parameters. Thus, we can 
conclude that in situations where the manufacturer is already offering the retailers a credit 
option, this alone may not be an efficient coordinating mechanism, resulting in an 
inordinately large credit payment period. In situations where such an option can serve 
well to coordinate the supply chain, the manufacturer will not offer a credit option under 
optimality. This implication represents an important guideline for practitioners under a 
centralized decision making scenario. 
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6. Conclusions and Future Research 
 
 
 
    This thesis has attempted to explore the role of the trade credit (i.e. delayed payment) 
option in supply chains. Both decentralized and centralized models are analyzed to 
provide some insights concerning the effectiveness of this widely used business practice 
as a tool for improving supply chain profitability. The conditions under which a trade 
credit policy is preferred as a means to stimulate market demand are outlined though 
detailed sensitivity analysis. The efficacy of trade credit as a coordination mechanism is 
also analyzed. The appropriate range of the length of the credit period necessary for 
proper coordination of the supply chain, benefiting all the concerned parties so that each 
of them has sufficient incentive to adopt system optimal decisions is derived. 
 
In the deterministic part of this study, we compare two different coordination 
mechanisms, viz. a credit payment option and a wholesale price discount, for two-
echelon supply chains in the presence of price sensitive consumer demand. Our analysis 
shows that the credit payment option is more effective, in terms of enhancing total supply 
chain profit via coordination, than the price discount offer. The share of the total supply 
chain profit, however, appears to be tilted more heavily in favor of the buyer at the 
expense of the supplier, especially for relatively short credit periods. As an alternative, a 
reasonable credit payment option, in line with existing industry practice, used in 
conjunction with a wholesale discount policy, focused on equitable profit sharing by the 
buyer and the supplier, results in greater total profit enhancement, compared to the 
implementation of only a trade credit period policy.  
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Our work makes it clear for practicing managers that supply chain coordination can 
yield substantial dividends in terms increased profitability. It will not be too farfetched, 
thus, to suggest to practitioners that a fair and equitable profit sharing policy through a 
wholesale price discount coupled with a reasonable credit payment option, allowing the 
buyer to make purchase payments with some time flexibility, can be more desirable 
economically for all concerned parties, compared to independent and individual decision 
making. The results obtained in this paper are likely to be helpful towards structuring 
supply chain contracts involving issues such as lot sizes, prices, credit payment and 
wholesale price discount terms, etc.  
 
In the stochastic portion of this work, we develop models with uncertainty in market 
demand. Two inventory replenishment policies: the (r, Q) continuous review and the (S, 
T) periodic review policies are examined in a two-echelon supply chain environment. 
Under each policy, the buyer’s pricing and purchasing decisions and the supplier’s 
production, trade credit and/or wholesale price discount policies are determined. Detailed 
sensitivity analysis via a set of computational experiments is performed in this section, in 
order to examine the effects of some selected parameters on the optimal credit period 
length in the case of decentralized control. Under centralized decision making, we 
determine the appropriate range for the credit period allowance necessary for supply 
chain coordination without placing any of the parties in a disadvantageous position. In 
contrast with this approach, in the case of the deterministic coordination model presented 
earlier, a fixed trade credit period is offered by the supplier to the buyer. Sensitivity 
analysis of the lower and upper limits of the trade credit period with respect to supply 
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chain performance is conducted for testing the practicability of our suggested approach 
under stochastic conditions.   
 
Under the presence of multiple competing retailers, we examine the supply chain 
under two different scenarios with either a fixed market or a flexible market. Our goal is 
to explore the effects of changes in competition, in the fixed market case, and those due 
to changes in market size, in the flexible market environment, on the trade credit decision 
and the desirability of coordinating the supply chain. 
 
Our attempts to address the important questions and issues raised in the Introduction 
Section and our foregoing explorations in this research area point to a set of key findings 
and conclusions. These are summarized below. 
 
 In determining the respective inventory replenishment and pricing decisions with 
price sensitive demand, we find that under deterministic, as well as stochastic 
environments, in the presence of single or multiple retailers, the supplier may not 
always prefer to offer a trade credit option to the buyer. This finding holds for both 
centralized and decentralized decision making. Nevertheless, under certain operating 
conditions, a trade credit offer can serve as an effective coordination mechanism. 
More specifically, when market demand is relatively stable (i.e. low coefficient of 
variation) and when the buyer’s cost of capital is relatively high, an appropriate trade 
credit policy can transfer the supply chain surplus from the supplier to the retailer 
more effectively. 
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 When a trade credit policy by itself is not sufficient to coordinate a supply chain 
effectively, a wholesale price quantity discount mechanism can be used, in 
conjunction with an appropriate trade credit offer, towards efficient profit sharing and 
achieving supply chain coordination. This result has not been reported in previous 
research. Furthermore, this approach is relatively easy to implement and appears to 
have some practical merit. 
 
 It is only desirable for the supplier to offer the buyer a trade credit payment option in 
the decentralized game, under certain parametric conditions. The major factors of 
relevance here are the price-sensitivity of consumer demand and its own cost of 
capital. When market demand is highly sensitive to retail price and the supplier’s cost 
of capital is relatively low, a judiciously formulated trade credit policy can be an 
attractive from the supplier’s perspective. The effects of some other problem 
parameter’s on the optimal trade credit policy are summarized in Table 4.2. 
 
 In the multiple competing retailers case, as the number of retailers increases, the 
supplier is less willing to offer a trade credit, since such an increase implies an 
increase in competition and a decline in the gap between individual optimal decisions 
and supply chain optimal decisions. This phenomenon is more prominent in a fixed 
market scenario, in comparison with a flexible market, where a new retailer entering 
the market has less influence on the existing retailers.  
  
In considering possible future research directions, it needs to be mentioned that we 
treat the supplier’s production rate, R, as a constant parameter. In practice, this rate can 
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be varied in many instances, albeit at additional cost. For example, the nominal 
production rate (i.e. nominal capacity) can be increased through overtime work, or 
decreased via labor underutilization. Note that the product’s market demand, D, is price 
dependent, leading to the vendor’s utilization factor D/R. Thus, a capability of varying 
the production rate may further enhance the supplier’s, as well as the supply chain’s 
profitability. Once again, for the sake of simplicity, we assume a constant production rate 
here and suggest that future studies consider the production rate (or, alternately, the 
utilization factor, ρ) as a decision variable.   
 
An interesting future research idea in this area would be to examine a scenario 
involving multiple manufacturers competing with each other, where some of them offer 
trade credit, while the others do not. In such a case, a credit option may be desirable for a 
specific manufacturer (even though such a policy may not be preferable under the 
corresponding single manufacturer, single retailer scenario). Under such circumstances, a 
delayed payment option is expected to increase the market share of the manufacturer in 
question. Nevertheless, the modeling of the effect of trade credit on a supplier’s market 
share would pose a challenging, albeit interesting, task. Here heterogeneous 
manufacturers should be assumed for the purpose of obtaining meaningful results. It 
would also be interesting to explore the interactions between the credit period and other 
relevant factors, such as price, quality, etc. 
 
Other possibilities for future research may consider the incorporation of other supply 
chain coordination mechanisms, not examined in this study, in conjunction with a 
delayed payment option.  It would, indeed, be interesting to ascertain as to how a trade 
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credit policy would interact with other options offered, such as a customer return policy, 
a buy back option, etc. 
 
In conclusion, it is hoped that our results have shed some light on the appropriate 
design and utilization of two important supply chain coordination tools: credit payment 
policy and wholesale price discount. We also hope that our work will be helpful for 
future researchers in extending the concepts developed here and our findings to more 
realistic and complex real world supply chains involving, for instance, multiple products, 
deteriorating or limited shelf life items and supply chains with more than two echelons. 
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Appendix A: Proofs of Lemmas, Propositions and Mathematical Properties: 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 3.1:  In an un-coordinated supply chain with a delayed payment option,   
increases (or decreases) and   decreases or (increases) as the credit time,  , increases  (or 
decreases). 
 
    Proof:  In equation (3.8), shown in Section 3.3.1 of the text, let   increase and Q 
remain the same. The left-hand side of the equation does not change but the right-hand 
side increases. To achieve a new equilibrium by changing only , its value needs to 
increase, thus increasing the left-hand side and decreasing the right-hand side 
simultaneously. Since t and Q increase together, it is clear from equation (3.7) that, as a 
result, p must decrease.  
 
Lemma 3.1:                       obtained via the algorithm outlined in Section 3.4.1  
is the global optimum solution. 
 
Proof:   
The local optimum yielded by our algorithm above satisfies: 
                                                  .  
Assume there is another solution,                     , which is the global optimum, 
such that 
                                                    and      .  
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1. Since                                                   
                         and that   is a concave function in n for a fixed (p, 
Q) pair. We can conclude that                                         . 
 
2.  Similarly, we can show that                                        . 
 
3.  From 1 and 2, we have,  
                                                            
                   . 
 
4. Since
  
  
 
   
 
    
 
 
       , where 
  
  
    is a decreasing function in 
  and 
  
  
     
  
  
     for a fixed (p, Q) pair, we have    
                                         
  
  
    
            
            
                                        
  
  
  
    
            
            
  
             This contradicts statement 3 above. 
5. Thus, the assumption made at the outset cannot hold and                    
represent the global optimum solution.  
 
 
Sufficient condition for a local maximum in the buyer’s problem with (r, Q) policy:  
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The objective function for the buyer’s problem is: 
 
                           
    
 
    
 
 
        
    
 
      
                                                          
                                                                    (4.1) 
 
For notational simplicity in the following proof, we use   instead of      to denote the 
profit for the retailer, where the subscripts, respectively, represent the variables with 
respect to which the derivatives are obtained. The first order optimality conditions for the 
profit function (4.1) are 
 
    
  
  
      
    
 
            
    
  
  
   
    
  
 
  
 
  
    
  
         
     
  
  
                          
  
  
 
     
 
 
         
 
Thus, the Hessian matrix of the profit function can be written as follows: 
 
     
         
         
         
 , 
 
where the second order derivates are: 
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The second principle minor at the stationary point is: 
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In order to compute the determinant,      we first calculate the following terms: 
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Hence, we have 
      
      
      
  
       
    
  
              
       
  
             
          
    
  
               
       
 
          
 
If we expand the Hessian matrix by the first row: 
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Thus, the second order principle minor is positive under condition C(1), and the 
determinant of the Hessian matrix is negative under condition C(2), which are likely to 
hold in practical applications. When C1 and C2 are satisfied, the Hessian matrix of the 
stationary point is negative definite and the stationary point is a local maximum. 
 
    It can also be proved numerically that the Hessian at the stationary point is negative 
definite. 
 
Proposition 4.1: 
 
1) The optimal profit of the retailer increases in t. 
2) The profit function of the retailer is submodular in (r, Q), (r, p) and (p, Q). 
3) The optimal retail price of the retailer    decreases in t.  
 
Proof: 
1). According to the envelop theorem, 
   
 
  
 
   
  
       
     
    Thus, the maximum profit increases in t. 
 
88 
 
2). Taking the second-order partial derivative, 
 
   
    
   
    
  
            
   
    
      
    
  
             
   
    
    
    
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
          
 
        By the definition of submodularity,    is submodular in (r, Q), (r, p) and (p, Q). 
 
3).The variable t is in the objective function, associated only with p, i.e. 
 
   
    
   
    
 
  
     
 
According to the reciprocity condition, 
   
    
 
   
  
  . Therefore, 
   
  
  , i.e., the 
optimal price for the retailer decreases in t.  
 
Sufficient condition for a local maximum in the buyer’s problem under the (S, T) 
policy:  
 
The objective function for the buyer’s problem is: 
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                                  (4.11) 
 
Once again, for notational simplicity in the following proof, we use   instead of      
to denote the profit for the retailer, where the subscripts, respectively, represent the 
variables with respect to which the derivatives are obtained. Consequently, the first order 
optimality conditions for (4.11) are 
 
    
  
  
 
 
 
                
    
  
  
 
                                  
                               
         
  
  
               
     
 
 
         
 
 
 
                                                          
 
The Hessian matrix of the profit function can be written as follows: 
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where the second order derivates are: 
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The second principle minor at the stationary point is: 
 
      
      
      
 
                
 
     
      
  
                   
 
If we expand the Hessian matrix by the first row, we obtain 
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    Thus, when C3 is negative, the Hessian matrix of the stationary point is negative 
definite and the stationary point is a local maximum. 
 
It can also be proved numerically that the Hessian matrix at the stationary point is 
negative definite. 
 
 
Proposition 4.2: 
 
1) The optimal profit of the retailer increases in t. 
2) The profit function of the retailer is submodular in (z, T). 
3) The optimal retail price of the retailer    decreases in t.  
 
Proof: 
1). The proof is similar to proposition 4.1. Since 
   
 
  
 
   
  
       
     
    the manufacturer’s optimal profit increases in t. 
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2). Again, taking the second-order partial derivatives yield the following: 
 
   
    
            
       
         
    
   
    
  
    
 
         
 
 
           
   
    
    
    
  
      
    
 
                 
    
         
  
 
        Thus,    is only submodular in (z, T). 
 
3). The variable t only appears in the first-order condition of p, not in Q and r, and 
 
   
    
   
    
 
  
     
 
        
   
  
  has the same sign as 
   
    
, which is negative. Thus, the optimal price 
decreases in t.  
 
Lemma 5.1:                is jointly concave on   and   , if             
   
  
  . 
 
Proof: 
    The objective function is given by 
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            (5.1) 
    The second order derivatives of this function with respect to pi lead to 
     
    
    
         
    
    
   
    
            
  
     
    
    
      
  
    
  
     
Hence the determinant of the Hessian matrix is as follows:  
         
    
    
    
      
    
      
    
   
 
  
           
    
  
              
    
  
  
Clearly, this is strictly positive                
    
  
    
In other words if             
    
  
  , the Hessian matrix is strictly negative definite, 
indicating that the profit function (5.1) is strictly concave on    and   .  
 
Lemma 5.2: The equilibrium found in equation (5.2) and (5.3) is the unique equilibrium 
of the retailers’ problem. 
 
Proof: 
    The retailer’s profit function is expressed as 
                                   
          
  
   
  
 
                
           (5.1) 
the first order optimality conditions for which are 
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Rewriting condition (5.3) yields 
     
             
  
                                                                                                   (5.15) 
This indicates that each    is a function of the price    only, and does not depend on  the 
other order quantities. Inserting the result (5. 15) into the retailer’s profit function (5.1), 
we can reduce the objective function (5.1)  as a function of variable    only; i.e. 
                                                   
   
leading the following second order conditions: 
 
           
   
        
    
 
   
   
 
 
  
 
           
      
  
    
 
       
 
 
  
 
     
           
   
    
           
      
           
    
 
     
 
 
                
 
    Thus, satisfaction of the above sufficiency condition guarantees that the equilibrium 
solution for the retailer’s problem is unique.  
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Appendix B: Tables: 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of solutions 
Cases p Q D n t v d         
1 U 45.61 185.5 1032.2 3 - - - 9138.9 25873.8 35012.8 
2a U{t=1 m} 45.13 187.2 1051.8 3 0.083 - - 9140.7 26090.9 35231.6 
2b U{t=3 m} 44.18 190.9 1092.8 3 0.250 - - 9139.7 26537.6 35677.3 
2c U{t=opt} 44.80 188.5 1065.8 3 0.14 - - 9141.0 26244.5 35385.5 
3 C{d} 22.91 319.6 3564.2 5 - 13.67 31.6% 11253.4 31909.4 43162.8 
4a C{t=3 m} 23.17 320.1 3492.3 5 0.083 - - 32571.8 10950.5 43522.3 
4b C{t=2.25y} 20.70 376.7 4277.9 5 2.250 - - 20746.0 25927.4 46673.5 
5a C{d,t=1 m} 22.84 326 3582.8 5 0.083 13.81 30.9% 11268.0 31950.9 43218.9 
5b C{d,t=3 m} 22.68 330 3629.5 5 0.250 14.05 29.8% 11347.1 32175.2 43522.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3.2: Effects of varying   
  n           n* d   
    
     Increase  
1.76 3 0.00 10203.8 30209.5 40413.3 6 29.32% 12535.4 37112.6 49648.0 22.85% 
1.77 3 0.00 9928.5 29059.2 38987.6 6 29.33% 12232.7 35803.4 48036.1 23.21% 
1.78 3 0.04 9659.4 28057.9 37717.3 6 29.39% 11903.1 34575.3 46478.4 23.23% 
1.79 3 0.09 9397.0 27135.0 36532.0 5 29.49% 11614.0 33480.3 45034.3 23.29% 
1.80 3 0.18 9138.9 25873.8 35012.8 5 29.77% 11347.1 32175.2 43522.3 24.30% 
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Table 4.1 Effects of    on  
   
beta t 
1.70 0 
1.72 0 
1.74 0.0147 
1.76 0.0721 
1.78 0.1257 
1.8 0.1760 
1.82 0.2227 
1.84 0.2665 
1.86 0.3000 
1.88 0.3000 
1.90 0.3000 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2   Effects of parameters on    and           
 
(a) Parameter Changes that increase   and            
                      
                     
                                          
 
(b) Parameter Changes that decreases   and            
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Table 5.1   Effects of n (in variable market) on    
                        
7 0.3877 38.93 69.94 570.8 3995.6 57180.1 6830.8 104995 
8 0.3097 38.85 64.75 503.2 4025.6 60456.8 5582.6 105118 
9 0.2363 38.78 61.27 450.5 4054.5 63599.8 4628.0 105252 
10 0.1676 38.71 58.33 408.3 4083.0 66607.3 3879.2 105399 
11 0.1036 38.63 55.82 373.9 4112.4 69478.3 3280.1 105559 
12 0.0444 38.56 53.63 345.2 4141.8 72212.4 2793.4 105733 
13 0.0000 38.43 51.84 322.4 4191.7 74807.5 2419.7 106263 
 
 
 
Table 5.2   Effects of parameters on    and           
(a) Parameter Changes that increase   and            
           
         
                  
 
(a) Parameter Changes that decreases   and            
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Appendix C: Figures: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Effects of   on retailer’s    and   
Fig 4.1: Effects of   on retailer’s variables in (r, Q) policy 
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(b) Effects of   on retailer’s    and   
Fig 4.1: Effects of   on retailer’s variables in (r, Q) policy 
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(c) Effects of   on retailer’s profit    
Fig 4.1: Effects of   on retailer’s variables in (r, Q) policy 
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Fig.4.2 Effects of   on   in (r, Q) policy 
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(a) Effects of   on retailer’s    and   
Fig 4.3: Effects of   on retailer’s variables in (S, T) policy 
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(b) Effects of   on retailer’s    and    
Fig 4.3: Effects of   on retailer’s variables in (S, T) policy 
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(c) Effects of   on retailer’s profit    
Fig 4.3: Effects of   on retailer’s variables in (S, T) policy 
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(a) Effects of    on   
Fig. 4.4 Effects of             on  
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(b) Effects of    on   
Fig. 4.4 Effects of             on  
   
 
 
 
 
 
0 
0.05 
0.1 
0.15 
0.2 
0.25 
0.3 
7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5 12 12.5 13 13.5 14 
o
p
ti
m
al
 c
re
d
it
 p
e
ri
o
d
 t
 
hc 
t 
107 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) Effects of   on   
Fig. 4.4 Effects of             on  
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(a) Effects of    on   
Fig.5.1 Effects of              on  
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(b) Effects of    on   
Fig.5.1 Effects of              on  
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(c) Effects of    on   
Fig.5.1 Effects of             on  
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